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JURISDICTION IN CONTRACTUAL MATTERS UNDER THE BRUSSELS IA 
REGULATION: WHERE DO MIXED CONTRACTS STAND? 
 
 
Diletta Danieli* 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. The Brussels regime regarding jurisdiction in contractual matters and its 
application to mixed contracts. – 2. The interpretation provided (so far) by the Court 
of Justice of the European Union on Art. 5 of the Brussels I Regulation. – 3. National 
courts applying the Brussels regime to cases involving mixed contracts: some 
examples. – 4. Final remarks. 
 
 
1. The Brussels regime regarding jurisdiction in contractual matters and its 
application to mixed contracts 
 
The Brussels Ia Regulation (No 1215/20121, hereinafter also Recast) represents the 
latest frontier in European private international law, having recast the previous Brussels 
I Regulation (No 44/20012) that was the cornerstone of cross-border litigation in civil and 
commercial matters, together with the Rome I and II Regulations on the law applicable 
to contractual and non-contractual obligations, respectively3. The EU Commission 
                                                 
Double blind peer reviewed article. 
* Research fellow in European Union Law at the University of Verona. E-mail: diletta.danieli@univr.it 
1 Regulation 1215/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, of 12 December 2012, in OJ L 
351, 20 December 2012, pp. 1-32. It applies since 10 January 2015, except for Arts. 75-76 that apply since 
10 January 2014. 
2 Regulation 44/2001/EC of Council, on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters, of 22 December 2000, in OJ L 12, 16 January 2001, pp. 1-23. 
3 Regulation 593/2008/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations (Rome I), of 17 June 2008, in OJ L 177, 4 July 2008, pp. 6-16, and Regulation 
864/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations (Rome II), of 11 July 2007, in OJ L 199, 31 July 2007, pp. 40-49. 
Diletta Danieli 
103 
www.fsjeurostudies.eu 
proposal of December 20104 was preceded by extensive preparatory works5 that showed 
an overall successful functioning of the Brussels I Regulation, but also a number of 
aspects that could be subject to amendments in order to set up an improved piece of 
legislation in this area of judicial cooperation policy. Indeed, in light of the outcomes of 
these preliminary activities, the proposal focused on four main shortcomings (recognition 
and enforcement procedures, disputes involving third country defendants, choice of court 
agreements and arbitration proceedings), while maintaining the fundamental system of 
rules of the previous Regulation6. 
With particular regard to jurisdiction in contractual matters, which is the specific topic 
of this paper, the Recast did not provide any change, but rather confirmed the regime 
already set forth in the previous legal instrument. The relevant rule is now Art. 7 of the 
Recast that replicates Art. 5 of the Brussels I Regulation7. As is well known, said 
provision introduces a ground of jurisdiction that is alternative to the general principle of 
the defendant’s domicile, on the basis of a “close connection between the court and the 
action” (Recital 16 of the Recast). In particular, such requirement is conveyed by allowing 
for a person domiciled in a Member State to be sued in another Member State where “the 
place of performance of the contractual obligation in question” is located (Art. 7(1)(a)). 
The substantial innovation brought about by Regulation No 44/2001, and confirmed in 
the Recast, compared to its predecessor (the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction 
and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters) is however the special 
rule set out in para. (1)(b) for contracts for the sale of goods and contracts for the provision 
of services. Here the Regulation directly defines the place of performance of the 
obligation characterising the two types of contract that amounts to the connecting factor 
                                                 
4 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast), of 14 December 2010, 
COM(2010) 748 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu. 
5 They included a Report from the Commission, as required by Art. 73 of Brussels I Regulation itself (21 
April 2009, COM(2009) 174 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu), a Green Paper (21 April 2009, 
COM(2009) 175 final, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu) and two comparative studies (Report on the 
Application of the Regulation Brussels I in the Member States presented by Prof. B. Hess, Prof. T. Pfeiffer 
and Prof. T. Schlosser, final version September 2007, also known as “Heidelberg Report”, and Study on 
Residual Jurisdiction prepared by Prof. A. Nuyts, final version 3 September 2007, both available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil). 
6 For a comprehensive examination of the solutions envisaged in the proposal, which fall outside the more 
limited scope of this work, see F. POCAR, I. VIARENGO, F.C. VILLATA (eds.), Recasting Brussels I, Padova, 
2012 (with particular regard to the topic of jurisdiction, see in this volume the essay by B. HESS, The 
Proposed Recast of the Brussels I Regulation: Rules on Jurisdiction, pp. 91-109). 
7 The literature on this topic has extensively developed over the years. Just to name a few, see K. 
TAKAHASHI, Jurisdiction in matters relating to contract: Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention and 
Regulation, in European Law Review, 2002, n. 5, pp. 530-550; P. FRANZINA, La giurisdizione in materia 
contrattuale. L’art. 5 n. 1 del Regolamento n. 44/2001/CE nella prospettiva della armonia delle decisioni, 
Padova, 2006; M.A. LUPOI, Il nuovo foro per le controversie contrattuali, in Rivista trimestrale di diritto e 
procedura civile, 2007, n. 2, pp. 495-523; P.A. NIELSEN, European Contract Jurisdiction in Need of 
Reform?, in G. VENTURINI, S. BARIATTI (a cura di), Nuovi strumenti del diritto internazionale privato. Liber 
Fausto Pocar, vol. 2, Milano, 2009, pp. 773-784; and more recently T.M. KADNER GRAZIANO, Jurisdiction 
under Article 7 No. 1 of the Recast Brussels I Regulation: Disconnecting the procedural place of 
performance from its counterpart in substantive law. An analysis of the case law of the ECJ and proposals 
de lege lata and de lege ferenda, in Yearbook of Private International Law, 2014/2015, pp. 167-217. 
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to establish the jurisdiction: for the former contracts, the relevant location is the place of 
delivery of the goods, whereas for the latter ones, it is the place of provision of the 
services. Para. (1)(c) complements the provision by setting up the relationship between 
the two rules, according to which point (a) applies whenever point (b) does not. 
The starting point of the considerations here proposed comes from a rather 
controversial issue, which is the applicability of the above-mentioned rules to mixed 
contracts, i.e. contracts that comprise elements of a sale alongside with obligations to 
produce or manufacture goods, or to supply services. This kind of agreements has never 
been directly regulated by the Brussels jurisdictional regime, and the Recast Regulation 
followed its precedents by choosing not to introduce any specific provision in this regard. 
Nevertheless, at the international level there have been other legal instruments that 
addressed the issue of jurisdiction in cases involving mixed contracts, which could have 
offered a legislative example to draw inspiration from. For instance, the 1999 Hague 
Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters provided for a contractual forum specifically dedicated to “matters 
relating both to the supply of goods and the provision of services”, according to which a 
plaintiff may bring action in the courts of the State where the “performance of the 
principal obligation took place in whole or in part” (Art. 6(c))8. Such a provision does not 
of course solve all the questions that could potentially arise in similar cases (the most 
obvious being to establish the principal obligation on a case-by-case basis), but it offers, 
at least, a general rule to assess the issue of mixed contracts9. 
Given the current legislative framework provided for in the Recast, however, the 
allocation of jurisdiction still appears to be debatable in these cases. On the one hand, the 
types of obligations involved are those selected by the special rule of Art. 7(1)(b), but, on 
the other hand, their combination could theoretically justify the application of the general 
rule laid down in para. (1)(a), as required by para. (1)(c). 
The aim of this paper is thus to examine, firstly, the interpretation of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (hereinafter also CJEU) regarding the rules on jurisdiction 
in contractual matters provided for in the Brussels I Regulation and, secondly, their 
implementation by some national courts that have been called upon to rule on cases 
                                                 
8 The Preliminary Draft Convention was adopted by the Special Commission on 30 October 1999 and 
accompanied by the Report drawn up by P. Nygh and F. Pocar (see Prel. Doc. No 11, August 2000, available 
at www.hcch.net; in the literature see F. POCAR, C. HONORATI (eds.), The Hague Preliminary Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments, Padova, 2005) as part of the work carried out for the Judgments 
Project of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, which started in 1992. The initial project of 
a broad convention on both jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement rules was later scaled down to 
focus on choice of courts agreements and led to the Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Courts 
Agreements. More recently, the Project has been re-launched and the Special Commission is developing a 
draft convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. From 16 to 24 February 2017 the 
Special Commission met for its second meeting and adopted the February 2017 draft convention (available 
at www.hcch.net). 
9 In the absence of an express provision in the Brussels I Regulation, it was indeed suggested to take as a 
reference the mentioned Art. 6(c) of the Draft Hague Convention: see K. TAKAHASHI, Jurisdiction in 
matters relating to contract, cit., p. 533. 
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involving mixed contracts. In light of the above, the final considerations will attempt to 
provide an interpretative solution to this open (and relatively unaddressed) issue. 
 
 
2. The interpretation provided (so far) by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
on Art. 5 of the Brussels I Regulation 
 
The CJEU has actually ruled in various occasions on the interpretation of Art. 5(1)(b) 
of the Brussels I Regulation, and these precedents are surely applicable to Art. 7(1)(b) of 
the Recast as well, given the substantially unchanged wording and scope of the two 
provisions. The EU court, however, has not directly dealt with cases involving mixed 
contracts, still it provided valuable guidance that can prove useful when applying the 
existing rules to such instances. 
For the purposes of this paper, therefore, the case law analysis focuses on those CJEU 
decisions that have dealt with the definition of the concepts of “sale of goods” and 
“provision of services” in the context of the Regulation and the criteria to distinguish 
between them, also when they have to be applied to specific types of contract. 
With regard to the first aspect, the Falco case10 took into account a contract under 
which the owner of an intellectual property right had granted its contractual partner the 
use thereof in return for remuneration. When establishing whether such contract could 
fall within the meaning of Art. 5(1)(b), second indent, of the Brussels I Regulation, the 
CJEU observed that the qualification did not need to comply with the approach developed 
for the purposes of the freedom to provide services under Art. 50 of the EC Treaty (now 
Art. 57 TFEU), nor with the concept of services provided by EU secondary legislation on 
VAT. In fact, the possibility to apply the Regulation also by means of other heads of 
jurisdiction justified a narrower interpretation according to which the notion of provision 
of services required, “at the least, that the party who [had provided] the service carrie[d] 
out a particular activity in return for remuneration”11. Moreover, such activity was to be 
understood as a performance of positive acts, with the consequence that the contract at 
hand fell outside the scope of Art. 5(1)(b), second indent, since “the owner of an 
intellectual property right [had] not perform[ed] any service in granting a right to use that 
property”12. Nevertheless, the Brussels I Regulation was applicable pursuant to para. 
(1)(a) of the same provision. 
Similarly, in another instance (Corman-Collins case13) the CJEU had to establish 
whether Art. 5(1)(b), second indent, could be applied to an exclusive distribution 
agreement. Building upon the interpretation given in Falco, the Court acknowledged both 
                                                 
10 Court of Justice, judgment of 23 April 2009, Falco Privatstiftung, Thomas Rabitsch v. Gisela Weller-
Lindhorst, case C-533/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:257. All CJEU judgments cited in this paper are available at 
http://curia.europa.eu. 
11 Court of Justice, Falco, cit., para. 29. 
12 Court of Justice, Falco, cit., paras. 30-31. 
13 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 December 2013, Corman-Collins SA v. La Maison du Whisky SA, case 
C-9/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:860. 
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the performance of “positive acts” by the distributor (namely, the distribution of the 
grantor’s products) and the remuneration paid as consideration for such activity, which 
should not be understood strictly “as the payment of a sum of money”, but more generally 
as an advantage conferred to the exclusive distributor over other sellers14. Therefore, the 
characteristic obligations of the contract in question were classified as provisions of 
services under Brussels I Regulation. 
As far as the distinction between the two types of contract provided for in Art. 5(1)(b) 
is concerned, the CJEU in Car Trim15 examined a contract for the supply of goods to be 
produced or manufactured, where the customer had specified certain requirements with 
regard to the provision, fabrication and delivery of the components to be produced. In this 
case, which could not be directly classified into one of the two indents of the mentioned 
provision, the Court reminded that it was necessary “to take as a basis the obligation (…) 
characteris[ing] the contract at issue”16. Then, it took into consideration several factual 
elements that could be referred to as an indication to determine the characteristic 
obligation of the agreement in question. First, the requirements specified by the purchaser 
regarding the provision, fabrication and delivery of the goods did not, by themselves, alter 
a possible qualification as sales contract, in accordance with the rules provided for in 
other legal instruments at both EU and international level17. Second, where the purchaser 
had supplied the raw materials used to produce the goods, the contract would be classified 
as a sale rather than a provision of services. Third, the supplier’s responsibility played a 
significant role as well: where the seller was responsible for the quality of goods or only 
for the correct implementation of the contract, the contract would be qualified as a sale 
of goods or a provision of services, respectively. Applying these criteria to the case at 
hand, the supply contract was thus classified as a sale of goods within the meaning of Art. 
5(1)(b), first indent, of Brussels I Regulation. 
More recently, in the Granarolo case18 the CJEU was again called upon to rule on the 
distinguishing features of the two contracts provided for in Art. 5(1)(b). The preliminary 
ruling regarded a long-standing business relationship between two companies that had to 
be classified as either a sale of goods or a provision of services. To this end, the Court 
referred to its previous case law and confirmed that the characteristic obligation of a sale 
of goods had to be the “supply of goods”19, whereas the concept of provision of services 
required the performance of “a particular activity in return for remuneration”20. 
                                                 
14 Court of Justice, Corman-Collins, cit., parr. 38-40. 
15 Court of Justice, judgment of 25 February 2010, Car Trim GmbH v. Keysafety Systems Srl, case C-
381/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:90. 
16 Court of Justice, Car Trim, cit., par. 32. 
17 Namely, Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, on certain aspects of the 
sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees, of 25 May 1999, in OJ L 171, 7 July 1999, pp. 12-16, 
and the 1980 United Nations Convention on contracts for the international sale of goods (CISG). 
18 Court of Justice, judgment of 14 July 2014, Granarolo SpA v. Ambrosi Emmi France SA, case C-196/15, 
EU:C:2016:559. 
19 Court of Justice, Granarolo, cit., par. 34. 
20 Court of Justice, Granarolo, cit., par. 37. 
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In light of the indications offered by the EU court, where a contract includes elements 
of a sale of goods and a provision of services it seems reasonable to establish, first and 
foremost, its characteristic obligation, in accordance with the fundamental principle 
governing the functioning of the heads of jurisdiction in contractual matters set forth by 
the Brussels regime. In this regard, the interpretation of the concepts of sale of goods and 
provision of services, as well as the factual elements distinguishing the two types of 
contract provided for in para. (1)(b) shall direct the assessment, which needs to be carried 
out on the basis of the circumstances of each case and to ultimately comply with the 
objectives of proximity and predictability underlying the whole Regulation. 
 
 
3. National courts applying the Brussels regime to cases involving mixed contracts: 
some examples 
 
After analysing the relevant CJEU judgments, the inquiry turns to some cases arisen 
in national case law in order to verify the consistency of the related decisions with the 
guidelines provided by the EU court when dealing with cases that do not fall directly 
under any of the special heads of jurisdiction for a sale of goods or a provision of services. 
Also these decisions actually involve Art. 5 of the previous Brussels I Regulation, but 
their reach can be extended to the corresponding Art. 7 of the Recast, as already 
mentioned when examining the EU case law. 
A significant precedent comes from a decision rendered by the Higher Regional Court 
of Cologne (Oberlandesgericht Köln) in 200521 that ruled on the international jurisdiction 
of the lower court (Landgericht Köln) pursuant to Art. 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation 
in a case regarding a supply of prototypes designed by a company based in Italy for a new 
model of electric windows produced by a company based in Spain. These items had been 
delivered in Cologne to a satellite company of the Spanish party. 
The Italian company brought action against its counterparty before the Landgericht 
Köln claiming the payment for the supply. The Regional Court of Cologne denied its 
jurisdiction in the dispute at hand on the basis of a clause provided for in the general terms 
and conditions drafted by the Spanish party according to which the Tribunal of Valencia 
was the competent court to hear cases arising between the parties. In particular, such 
clause was considered as a valid choice of court agreement under the meaning of Art. 23 
of the Brussels I Regulation. 
The Italian company appealed the first instance judgment before the 
Oberlandesgericht Köln, claiming that the international jurisdiction of the German court 
should have been based on Art. 5(1)(b) of Brussels I Regulation since said choice of court 
                                                 
21 Higher Regional Court of Cologne, judgment of 14 March 2005, Az. 16 U 89/04, available at 
http://openjur.de. 
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clause did not comply with any of the substantial and formal requirements listed in Art. 
23 of the same Regulation22. 
For the purposes of the ruling on the jurisdictional issue, the Higher Regional Court 
firstly assessed the contents of the agreement between the parties. Given the combination 
of elements of a sale of goods (namely, the duty to supply and to transfer the ownership 
of the finished products) and of a provision of services (that were the development and 
creation of the prototypes)23, it was qualified as a mixed contract (“gemischter Vertrag”). 
Consequently, the Court had to establish which obligation could be deemed as 
“characteristic” (“vertragscharakteristisch”), i.e. the main obligation performed under 
the contract that served as the jurisdictionally relevant obligation within the meaning of 
par. (1)(b). The activities undertaken by the Italian company of developing and creating 
the prototypes outweighed the subsequent delivery and acquisition of title of the items, 
therefore the contractual aspects of a provision of services prevailed over the ones of a 
sale of goods24. The Court thus held that Cologne could not be considered as the place of 
performance of the disputed contract pursuant to Art. 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation 
and, for this reason, the Landgericht was not competent to hear the case. 
Another relevant example is a judgment given in 2013 by an Italian Court of first 
instance (Tribunale di Tolmezzo)25. The factual background of the case refers to a 
subcontracting agreement between a company based in Italy and a company based in 
Austria, whereby the former had to manufacture steel rings, to be used in the construction 
of funicular railways, according to the technical requirements provided by the latter. The 
Italian party applied for an order of payment for said supply, which was issued by the 
                                                 
22 It is worth briefly recalling that for an agreement conferring jurisdiction to courts of a Member State to 
be valid, Art. 23 of Brussels I Regulation prescribed at least one of the parties to be domiciled in a Member 
State, as well as certain formal conditions to be met. Namely, the agreement shall be either: “(a) in writing 
or evidenced in writing, or (b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established 
between themselves, or (c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of 
which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known 
to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce 
concerned” (para. 1). The CJEU has further specified these requirements in several judgments, particularly 
as to choice of court clauses included in general terms and conditions (see for example judgment of 21 May 
2015, Jaouad El Majdoub v. CarsOnTheWeb.Deutschland GmbH, case C-322/14, EU:C:2015:334), and to 
the concept of usage regularly observed in international trade or commerce (already with regard to the 
corresponding provision of the 1968 Brussels Convention see judgment of 20 February 1997, 
Mainschiffahrts-Genossenschaft eG (MSG) v. Les Gravières Rhénanes SARL, case C-106/95, 
EU:C:1997:70; judgment of 16 March 1999, Trasporti Castelletti Spedizioni Internazionali SpA v. Hugo 
Trumpy SpA, case C-159/97, EU:C:1999:142). The Recast has actually amended certain provisions in the 
new Art. 25 on prorogation of jurisdiction, the most relevant of which extends its applicability also to choice 
of court agreements concluded between parties not domiciled within the EU. 
23 Higher Regional Court of Cologne, judgment of 14 March 2005, Az. 16 U 89/04, cit., par. 30: “sowohl 
Elemente eines Kaufvertrages – Pflicht zur Lieferung und Übereignung der Waren – als auch Elemente 
eines Dienstleistungs- und Werkvertrages, soweit es um die Entwicklung und Herstellung der Fensterheber 
geht”. 
24 Higher Regional Court of Cologne, judgment of 14 March 2005, Az. 16 U 89/04, cit., par. 30: “überwiegt 
die Entwicklung und Herstellung der Produkte als Dienstleistungsanteil und lässt die Lieferung der Waren 
und die Eigentumsverschaffung hieran in den Hintergrund treten”. 
25 Court of first instance of Tolmezzo, civil division, judgment of 3 September 2013, No 200, available at 
www.avvocati.ud.it/vendita-o-prestazione-di-servizi/. 
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Tribunal and later opposed by the Austrian counterparty on the ground of the lack of 
jurisdiction of the Italian court, besides other objections on the merits of the case. 
In order to rule on the jurisdictional issue under Art. 5(1) of Brussels I Regulation, the 
Court of first instance of Tolmezzo was preliminarily required to classify the contract 
concluded between the parties. In this regard, it supported the reasoning of the Italian 
manufacturer, according to which the agreement was not a sale of goods, but rather a 
works contract where the supplier had to acquire the raw materials and to carry out a 
specific process to create the finished products. The characteristic obligation of said 
contract was thus the work performed by the manufacturer, whereas the subsequent 
delivery of the items in Austria was deemed to be a secondary commitment pertaining to 
the final stage of the contractual relations26. Consequently, the Italian Court retained its 
jurisdiction pursuant to Art. 5(1)(b), second indent, given that Italy was the Member State 
where the services had been provided under the contract at issue. 
The approach taken in both the German and the Italian decisions appears to be in line 
with the above-mentioned CJEU case law. Indeed, the two national courts identified the 
characteristic obligation of a mixed contract on the basis of its prevailing features that 
were, in both instances, those of a provision of services since the parties providing the 
service had carried out an activity in return for remuneration, as the EU Court held in 
Falco, Corman-Collins and, more recently, in Granarolo27. This factual evaluation of the 
contractual agreement then led to determine which head of jurisdiction referred to in Art. 
5(1)(b) had to be applied in the case at hand. In particular, this is consistent with the 
judgments in Car Trim and Corman-Collins28, in which the EU Court stressed the 
relevance of the characteristic obligation serving as the connecting factor for the purposes 
of the classification of a contract under Art. 5(1)(b) of the Brussels I Regulation.  
This interpretative operation, moreover, is well adjusted with other EU legal 
instruments of private international law. More precisely, Recital 19 of Rome I Regulation 
expressly refers to the notion of the “centre of gravity” to determine the characteristic 
performance in cases where the “contract consist[s] of a bundle of rights and obligations 
capable of falling within more than one of the specified types of contract”. Even though 
the provision does not clarify how to intend such concept, it seems safe to say that the 
solution envisaged by these national courts is coherent with the legislative aim of the 
                                                 
26 Court of first instance of Tolmezzo, civil division, judgment of 3 September 2013, No 200, cit.: “(…) ai 
fini dell’adempimento di una siffatta commessa, dove[vano] essere effettuate tutta una serie di operazioni 
volte alla realizzazione di detta merce (anelli così come indicati), previa acquisizione del necessario 
materiale grezzo, mentre invece la successiva consegna del materia1e risultato dalla lavorazione (...) ne 
veniva a rappresentare, trattandosi appunto di appalto e non di mera vendita, soltanto la fase finale, senza 
che alla stessa, proprio per le caratteristiche di un tal tipo di rapporto contrattuale (appalto), avente come 
sua nota distintiva la prevalenza del lavoro, potesse riconoscersi in alcun modo carattere principale”. 
27 Respectively, Court of Justice, Falco, cit., par. 29; Corman-Collins, cit., par. 37, and Granarolo, cit., par. 
37. 
28 Respectively, Court of Justice, Car Trim, cit., par. 31, and Corman-Collins, cit., par. 34. 
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provision of pursuing predictability29, also with regard to the law applicable to the 
contract30. 
Furthermore, the reasoning of both these decisions can be applied to a similar recent 
case between a company based in Italy and a company based in Germany. The object of 
the contract was the prototype of a pipe welding machinery, which had to be designed 
and manufactured by the Italian party and subsequently installed on an already existing 
plant located in the facility of the German party in Bochum (Germany). The Italian 
company sued its counterparty before the Court of first instance of Pavia (Tribunale di 
Pavia) seeking for the payment of the supply in question, but the defendant lodged an 
application before the Italian Supreme Court (Corte di cassazione) asking for a ruling on 
the international jurisdiction of the court seised, pursuant to Art. 41 of the Italian civil 
procedural code (regolamento di giurisdizione). The Supreme Court was thus called upon 
to take a final and binding decision on this preliminary jurisdictional issue. 
It should go without saying that such agreement qualifies as a mixed contract, featuring 
both elements of a sale of goods (the supply of the final product) and of a provision of 
services (the design and actual creation of the prototype performed according to the 
technical requirements provided by the client). Following the above-mentioned approach 
grounded on the contract’s “centre of gravity”, the prevailing performance in the case at 
hand appears to be the highly specialised provision of services carried out by the Italian 
company in its facility, which further qualifies the agreement as a works contract. The 
subsequent installation in the plant of the German party, instead, should be downgraded 
to an ancillary obligation, albeit necessary to the fulfilment of the objective of the 
agreement. The Supreme Court should thus take the view that the Court of first instance 
of Pavia shall retain its jurisdiction over the dispute pursuant to Art. 5(1)(b), second 
indent, of Brussels I Regulation (still applicable ratione temporis), since the provision of 
services serving as characteristic performance of the contract had been performed in Italy. 
Nonetheless, the first court documents, namely the opinion of the attorney general of 
the Supreme Court (Procuratore generale)31, seem to support a different position. In fact, 
the agreement in question has been reasonably classified as a works contract, whose 
objective was however deemed to be the mere installation of the pipe welding machinery 
in the facility of the German company. On this ground, Art. 5(1)(a) of Brussels I 
Regulation was referred to as the relevant provision according to which the German 
judicial authorities shall have jurisdiction to rule on the case. 
                                                 
29 F. SALERNO, Giurisdizione ed efficacia delle decisioni straniere nel regolamento (UE) n. 1215/2012 
(rifusione), Padova, 2015, p. 150, observes how the rule of the centre of gravity seems fitting to the 
legislative system relying on the concept of characteristic obligations. On the complex qualification of 
contractual relationships that do not immediately fall within the notion of either a sale of goods or a 
provision of services see also S.M. CARBONE, C.E. TUO, Il nuovo spazio europeo in materia civile e 
commerciale. Il regolamento UE n. 1215/2012, Torino, 2016, p. 106. 
30 For further observations with regard to the law applicable, see also par. 4. 
31 More precisely, the opinion of the attorney general of the Supreme Court preceding the final decision 
was delivered on 20 June 2016. 
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Although the classification as a works contract is in line with the factual elements of 
the agreement, the conclusion reached appears rather unpersuasive as to its consistency 
with the provisions of the Regulation. Indeed, a works contract hardly falls outside the 
scope of application of a provision of services under para. (1)(b), second indent, which 
should have been applied as the relevant head of jurisdiction in the case at issue. The 
reference to para. (1)(a) thus seems questionable as to its coherence with the whole 
legislative framework provided in contractual matters. As it was pointed out before, the 
Brussels I Regulation introduced the new wording in para. (1)(b) in order to expressly 
identify the characteristic obligation in contracts of sale of goods and of provision of 
services, which amounts to the relevant head of jurisdiction in these specific instances. It 
follows that the application of point (a) should be limited to cases where the mentioned 
contracts are not involved at all, while where an agreement comprises elements of both a 
sale and a provision of services, the assessment should rely on the “centre of gravity” to 
determine which performance is the characteristic obligation of the given contract under 
one of the two indents of point (b). 
On 17 January 2017 the Supreme Court rendered its final decision on the case32. 
Preliminarily, it stated that both parties, as well as the attorney general in its opinion, have 
qualified the contractual relationship as a provision of services, more precisely as an 
international works contract. The relevant provision to rule on the jurisdictional issue was 
thus correctly identified in Art. 5(1)(b) of Brussels I Regulation. Then, the Court carried 
out the factual assessment in order to determine where the services were provided or 
should have been provided under the contract at issue. In this regard, it held that the 
contractual place of performance, to be understood as the place where the characteristic 
obligation was performed, was the German party’s facility located in Bochum. Several 
elements were recalled to support this view, among which the specific clauses provided 
in the contract, the payment split into various instalments (even after the completion of 
the work and its testing), the materials used to manufacture the machinery that were 
supplied by the German party and the management of the work at the contractor’s risk. 
In the Court’s reasoning, the assembly of the machinery, which was performed by the 
contractor in its facility located in Italy, was regarded as merely ancillary to the 
subsequent installation in Germany (i.e. the place of performance)33. Consequently, the 
Supreme Court held that the Court of first instance of Pavia lacked jurisdiction to rule on 
the merits of the case, as such competence rather laid with the German courts.  
Quite surprisingly, no relevance has been given in the final decision to the specialised 
provision of services undertaken in Italy, insofar as the Italian manufacturer had relied on 
his know-how and patented technologies to carry out a highly qualified performance and 
produce a one-of-a-kind prototype. Indeed, the Italian Supreme Court expressly rejected 
                                                 
32 Italian Court of Cassation, united divisions, judgment of 17 January 2017, No 965, available at 
www.italgiure.giustizia.it. 
33 Italian Court of Cassation, united divisions, judgment of 17 January 2017, No 965, cit.: “il luogo di 
adempimento della prestazione [era] necessariamente quello in cui doveva fornirsi ed installarsi l’impianto 
essendo stato effettuato l’assemblaggio di quest’ultimo presso la controricorrente al mero fine della 
successiva installazione presso la società tedesca costituente il luogo di adempimento”. 
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the view proposed by the Italian party according to which the qualifying performance in 
the contractual agreement was the design and manufacture of the machinery undertaken 
in its facility. As already mentioned, however, this conclusion seems questionable for the 
purposes of determining the “centre of gravity” of the contract at issue. It was rather the 
obligation performed in Italy that should have been considered in this regard, and not the 
subsequent final activities taking place in Germany, to the extent that this specialised 
provision of services appears to confer the distinctive character to the broader contractual 
relationship. 
 
 
4. Final remarks 
 
The chosen examples show the complex evaluation, on both factual and juridical 
levels, that is required to apply the (apparently plain) rules of jurisdiction in contractual 
matters under (now) Brussels Ia Regulation. The difficulties become all the more evident 
in cases involving mixed contracts, which are not directly regulated by EU law and thus 
entail an interpretative adaptation of the rules provided for in Art. 7(1) of the Regulation. 
In this regard, it appears preferable to share the view of the Higher Regional Court of 
Cologne and the Court of first instance of Tolmezzo, for the reasons already analysed, as 
opposed to the solution envisaged in the last mentioned case decided by the Italian 
Supreme Court. 
One last consideration is worth adding as to the different but related aspect of the law 
applicable to such cases. Following the reasoning grounded on the “centre of gravity” of 
a mixed contract, and thus identifying the agreement either as a sale of goods or a 
provision of services for the purposes of Art. 7(1)(b) of Brussels Ia Regulation, the 
subsequent application of Art. 4 of Rome I Regulation (provided that no choice of law 
has been made by the parties) may actually lead to opposite outcomes. In fact, para. 1 of 
said Article identifies two different connecting factors for the contracts of sale of goods 
and of provision of services: for the former, it is the habitual residence of the seller, 
whereas for the latter it is the habitual residence of the service provider. As a result, should 
a mixed contract be classified as a sale of goods on the basis of its prevailing characteristic 
performance, the courts having jurisdiction shall be those of the country where the goods 
have been delivered (basically, the buyer’s forum), but the law applicable shall be that of 
the country of habitual residence of the seller (i.e. the seller’s law)34. This disconnection 
between jurisdiction and applicable law is however not found in the case of a mixed 
contract that is classified as a provision of services, such as those mentioned above when 
                                                 
34 This peculiar effect is underlined, among others, by E.B. CRAWFORD, J.M. CARRUTHERS, Connection 
and coherence between and among European instruments in the private international law of obligations, 
in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2014, pp. 1-29, at p. 9, where the Authors define it as 
“harlequin-style”. Similarly, F. POCAR, Relationship between Rome I and Brussels I Regulation, in F. 
FERRARI, S. LEIBLE (eds.), Rome I Regulation. The Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations in Europe, 
Munich, 2009, pp. 343-348, at p. 346, stresses the inequitable “distribution of advantages” between the 
positions of the seller and the buyer in cases concerning a sale of goods. 
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examining national case law, given that both the competent court and the applicable law 
are determined on the basis of the service provider’s performance. 
Such distinction furthermore confirms how EU private international law instruments 
do pursue, in general, a coherence of their respective bodies of rules, but such objective 
is not to be understood narrowly35. In this regard, as it has been underlined, the 
harmonization system appears to have opted, in some cases, “for a solution based on 
uniform conflict of laws rules, while preserving a plurality of competent fora for the same 
legal situation”36. 
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35 This aspect is thoroughly investigated by R. CAFARI PANICO, La prestazione caratteristica tra legge 
applicabile e giurisdizione, in E. TRIGGIANI, F. CHERUBINI, I. INGRAVALLO, E. NALIN, R. VIRZO (a cura di), 
Dialoghi con Ugo Villani, Bari, 2017, p. 1093 ff. On the same issue, more in general, see also J. BASEDOW, 
Kohärenz im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht der Europäischen Union: Eine einleitende 
Oreintierung, in J. VON HEIN, G. RÜHL (Hrgs.), Kohärenz im Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht 
der Europäischen Union, Tübingen, 2016, pp. 2-23, especially at pp. 15-19. 
36 F. POCAR, Relationship between Rome I and Brussels I Regulation, cit., p. 344. For further considerations 
regarding the principles underlying the rules on jurisdiction under the Brussels Ia regime see P. FRANZINA, 
Armonia decisoria e competenza giurisdizionale nel regolamento “Bruxelles I-bis”, in G. BIAGIONI (a cura 
di), Il principio dell’armonia delle decisioni civili e commerciali nello spazio giudiziario europeo, Torino, 
2015, pp. 99-122. 
